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Abstract
Billions of wireless devices are foreseen to participate in big data aggregation and smart automation in order to
interface the cyber and physical worlds. Such large-scale ultra-dense wireless connectivity is vulnerable to malicious
software (malware) epidemics. Malware worms can exploit multi-hop wireless connectivity to stealthily diffuse
throughout the wireless network without being noticed to security servers at the core network. Compromised devices
can then be used by adversaries to remotely launch cyber attacks that cause large-scale critical physical damage and
threaten public safety. This article overviews the types, threats, and propagation models for malware epidemics in
large-scale wireless networks (LSWN). Then, the article proposes a novel and cost efficient countermeasure against
malware epidemics in LSWN, denoted as spatial firewalls. It is shown that equipping a strategically selected small
portion (i.e., less than 10%) of the devices with state-of-the-art security mechanisms is sufficient to create spatially
secured zones that quarantine malware epidemics. Quarantined infected devices are then cured by on-demand localized
software patching. To this end, several firewall deployment strategies are discussed and compared.
Index Terms
Cybersecurity, Malware epidemics, Massive wireless networks, Percolation theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
The imminent era of smart world relies on large-scale massive wireless connectivity that interfaces the
physical and cyber worlds. The surging Internet of Things (IoT) and cyber physical systems (CPS) with
massive numbers of heterogeneous wireless devices (e.g., sensors, actuators, smart phones, smart appliances,
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2autonomous vehicles, etc.) are examples of such massive large-scale wireless networks (LSWNs). IoT/CPS
are foreseen to provide flexible platforms for big data aggregation and/or smart automation to almost every
aspect in our lives [1]. For instance, intelligent transportation systems with connected/autonomous vehicles
exploit wireless connectivity to improve road safety and reduce traffic congestion. Smart power grids utilize
wireless connectivity for data communications and smart control (e.g., smart meters and field devices) in
order to enhance energy generation and distribution. Large scale massive connectivity is also a foundational
building block for process automation in the next industrial revolution (i.e., industry 4.0). In addition to
the aforementioned examples, large-scale massive wireless connectivity can bring unlimited potentials to
many other verticals such as health care, public safety, agriculture, retail, etc.
On the downside, massive LSWNs bring a multitude of new and challenging security threats [1].
Particularly, many of the wireless devices in the IoT/CPS are installed and controlled via consumers with
limited security background. The high competition between IoT/CPS manufacturers overlooks cybersecurity
aspects to reduce costs and keep-up with the rapid proliferation of IoT/CPS. Many IoT/CPS devices are
too constrained, in terms of computational power, energy, and storage, to implement and continuously
execute sophisticated defense mechanisms [2], [3]. Such lack of security oriented network administration
and per-device defense mechanisms opens several loopholes for adversaries to infiltrate malicious software,
or shortly malware, to the network.
Conventionally, malware programs are designed for variety of criminal and hostile activities such as
spying (spyware), threatening for monetary benefit (ransomware), and/or controlling large population of
devices (botnets). In IoT/CPS networks, malware hostile activities naturally extend to physical threats.
In smart vehicles, adversaries can control the vehicle through telematics unit, which introduce the risk
of physical denial of service (DoS) (e.g., stop the engine and lock doors/windows) as well as deliberate
collisions. In power grids, adversaries can compromise field devices (e.g., switch gears and circuit breakers)
to sabotage equipment, disrupt power distribution, and cause major blackouts. In medical care systems,
adversaries can inject false prescriptions and manipulate wearable drug infusion devices. In industrial
environments, adversaries can halt/manipulate ongoing production lines, delete customized machine setting,
or even damage products and injure workers. There could be also generic attacks for LSWN such as network
jamming and colluded eavesdropping. Note that network-jamming attacks may disrupt the entire network
connectivity via overwhelming interference and shorten the network lifetime by depleting compromised
devices batteries. Using colluded eavesdropping, adversaries can reveal and misuse private data.
Exploiting the massive spatial density in LSWN and multi-hop wireless connectivity (e.g., machine-to-
machine communications), the malware can stealthily propagate from one device to another and form an
epidemic outbreak without being noticed by the security administration at the core network [2], [4]. Even
worse, the emerging beyond 5G technologies (e.g., non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and ultra-
3reliable low latency communications (URLLC)), that are meant to enhance information dissemination, will
also accelerate epidemic outbreak throughout the network. An epidemic outbreak of a malware enables
the adversities to control a large population of devices and launch large-scale cyberphiscal attacks, which
may lead to catastrophic consequences in IoT/CPS. From the propagation point of view, malware can be
classified into the following categories
• Trojans: Malware hiding in legitimate programs but intended to infect a target system and open
backdoors for future intrusion.
• Virus: Self-replicating malware designated to infect and corrupt the operation of a target system.
Viruses propagates via host executable files.
• Worm: Self-replicating malware intended to spread and infect all the devices in a network. A worm
is a stand-alone software that automatically propagate from one device to another.
Human interventions, such as manual attacks by adversaries or infected file exchange/execution by
legitimate users,1 are required for Trojans and viruses to spread in a network. On the other hand, worm
malware automatically identifies network vulnerabilities to diffuse and compromise new targets. Exploiting
the dense network deployment, the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, the one-to-many communication
schemes (e.g, NOMA), and high-reliability-low-latency communications (e.g., URLLC), worm malware can
quickly and covertly spread in the wireless network and form an epidemic outbreak. This makes worm
epidemics the hardest to decelerate their diffusion and/or quarantine their infection. Hence, worm malware
is among the highest security threats for large-scale wireless networks [5].
II. SECURING LARGE-SCALE IOT/CPS
The aforementioned threatening physical consequences of malware intrusion in CPS/IoT call out for
robust security countermeasure and defense mechanisms. Securing the devices against manipulation and
intrusion is the first line of defense for IoT/CPS networks. Such defense mechanisms could be embedded
in hardware (e.g., trusted platforms), software (e.g., anti-malware programs), communication protocols
(e.g., encryption & authentication), and/or device operation (scheduled attestation/patching). However, the
strict cost, energy, and computational power constraints of devices in many IoT/CPS applications limit the
implementation of sophisticated defense mechanisms to all devices. In this regards, [3] proposes a Poisson
game to distributively decide on which devices to adopt an anti-malware such that an epidemic outbreak
is prevented. However, the proposed mechanism in [3] is based on a fully mixed epidemic model,2 which
overlooks the spatial topology and limited wireless communication range in LSWN.
1Legitimate users can be incentivised to install free programs that contain malware.
2A fully mixed epidemic model assumes that an infection (e.g., malware) can be directly transmitted from any node in the network to any
other node in the network.
4Another effective, yet simple, defense mechanism is to perform scheduled (i.e., periodic) software
attestation/patching for IoT/CPS devices to ensure configurations integrity and wipeout potential malicious
software [6], [7]. However, to thwart epidemic diffusion, the treatment rate should be faster than the epidemic
infection rate. Being oblivious to the device status, unnecessary disruption for the IoT/CPS operation may
occur due to attesting/patching healthy devices [6]. Furthermore, a device that is compromised shortly after
being patched/attested, may have enough time to be exploited to launch versatile malicious attacks. Such
problems are more acute when employing wireless technologies such as NOMA and URLLC due to the
accelerated epidemic infection rate.
To efficiently balance the tradeoff between cybersecurity, anti-malware license cost, and devices hardware
complexity, this paper proposes a novel ubiquitous security countermeasure, denoted as “spatial firewalls”,
which is meant to detect, spatially quarantine, and report malware infections in LSWN. The proposed spatial
firewalls countermeasure is detailed in Section III. Section IV highlights the mathematical propagation
models for malware in LSWN, which are necessary to design and assess cybersecurity countermeasures.
Section V showcases and assesses the spatial firewalls solution before the paper is concluded in Section VI.
III. THE SPATIAL FIREWALLS SOLUTION
To secure massive LSWN against malware epidemics, this paper proposes to implement “spatial fire-
walls”, which are defined as follows:
Definition 1. Spatial Firewalls are wireless devices, with sufficient computational capabilities, energy
resources, and memory, to store, execute, and frequently update anti-malware and intrusion detection
programs (e.g., edge computing devices, access points, junction nodes). These devices are deployed at
critical locations within a LSWN to enforce secured zones in order to quarantine any emerging malware
epidemic and thwart its outbreak.
Fig. 1 illustrates the spatial firewall operation in massive LSWNs. Devices that are adjacent to a firewall
inquire about codes (e.g., software updates, system configurations, or control commands) received from
their wireless interface. For each validation inquiry, the firewall ensures that the code is malware free (e.g.,
using signature-based or anomaly-based detection) and verifies its integrity (e.g., using operator digital
signature and certificates) [7]. Only validated codes are approved for execution and/or dissemination to
other devices. If a threat is detected, the firewall disapproves the code execution/dissemination and reports
the incident to the security administration. Hence, each firewall creates a secured zone, determined by its
wireless range, for adjacent devices and thwarts their infection (i.e., analogous to herd immunity effect).
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the spatial firewalls operation in massive LSWN to quarantine malware diffusion. The
secured zones succeed to spatially quarantine the malware infection within a confined area with limited
number of devices. The security administration can then launch a localized software patching campaign to
cure and secure the infected devices.
Thus, firewalls enable an exclusive dissemination of legitimate codes through the network.3 In summary,
spatial firewalls are meant to i) create spatially secured zones within the wireless network, ii) thwart the
dissemination of malware (i.e., ensure that malware can only infiltrate to limited number, by design, of
devices regardless of the infection/treatment rates), and iii) initiate on-demand software attestation/patching
for infected devices.
It is worth noting that extending the firewall code validation scheme for non-adjacent devices through
multi-hop wireless inquiries may impose overwhelming signaling overhead and large control latency due
to the massive and wide-scale deployment of devices. To balance the security, signaling overhead, and
control latency of the network, the code-validation role of the firewall is limited to adjacent devices. As
such, the design objective is to have sufficient numbers of efficiently located firewalls to satisfy the security
requirements of the network, which may tolerate interim infection of some devices (i.e., until being detected
3Different from legacy IT systems, IoT/CPS networks have no clear boundary between secured and unsecured (i.e., public) domains. Hence,
the proposed spatial firewalls enforce the concept of secured zones within the wireless network.
6and patched).
As compared to scheduled patching/software attestation [6], [7], spatial firewalls provide ubiquitous
security countermeasure that reacts to attacks by i) thwarting malware diffusion, ii) localizing infected
(i.e., quarantined) regions,4 and iii) initiating localized software attestation/patching campaigns. Due to
the overwhelming overhead and time required for brute-force software attestation/patching of all devices,
localizing infected regions is necessary in massive LSWN.
A. Practical Implementation Challenges
To conceptualize and materialize the spatial firewalls cybersecurity countermeasure, several practical
challenges should be taken into consideration, which include
• Firewall deployment: The main technical challenge is to determine the number of firewalls and their
spatial locations that guarantee spatially quarantined malware.
• Techno-economic aspects: The firewall deployment should account for the trade-off between net-
work security, involved capital-expenditure (CAPEX) to deploy firewalls, and operational-expenditure
(OPEX) to maintain their up-to-date anti-malware programs and licenses. In case of multiple IoT/CPS
operators/owners, an agreement for bearing such CAPEX and OPEX is required.
• Operator privacy: In case of multiple operators, code verification and software attestation schemes
should keep the specific information and configurations of the operators hidden from each other.
• Devices heterogeneity: For universal utilization of spatial firewalls, unified/standardized signaling
protocols for different IoT/CPS devices using different wireless interfaces are required. Such signaling
protocols should define the method for firewall discovery, association, and templates for code validation
inquiries/responses.
• Signaling overhead: Efficient signaling schemes are required for code verification to impose minimum
disruption to the existing data traffic. For instance, encrypted digital signature for firewalls should be
developed to eliminate redundant validation of the same code across different firewalls.
• Latency: The code validation and execution should occur within the tolerable latency defined by
data communications and/or control applications. This may require developing security-aware traffic
prioritization schemes that expedite firewalls related signaling.
• Devices Mobility: Malware may get through the secured-zones by means of physical mobility of
infected devices. Hence, the spatial firewalls should be able to detect and cure infected mobile devices
passing through secured zones.
4The location of quarantined regions can be inferred from the reporting firewalls identities and known locations.
7This paper focuses on the spatial firewall deployment that ensures spatially quarantined malware. Other
challenges are left for future extensions. In particular, we aim to provide guidelines to design and assess the
impact of implementing spatial firewalls. To minimize the associated CAPEX and OPEX, the objective is
to find the minimum number of firewalls that enforce an epidemic free network operation. For this purpose,
we first present the underlying mathematical models for malware propagation that are used to formulate
and solve the spatial firewall design problem. Then, several spatial deployment strategies for firewalls are
discussed and compared.
IV. PROPAGATION MODELS FOR MALWARE EPIDEMICS
Mathematical models that characterize propagation of infection in large populations are used to predict
epidemic outcomes and design defense mechanisms. In IT systems, the population represents a network of
connected devices. The network topology is mathematically described by a graph G = {V,E}, where V is
the set of vertices (i.e., devices) and E is the set of edges connecting the vertices (see Fig. 2). In the context
of wireless networks, an edge between two devices implies that they are within the communication range
of each other. The communication range is usually defined by a minimum required signal-to-interference-
plus-noise-ratio (SINR) [8]. Graphs that account for the random spatial locations of the devices and their
wireless communications ranges are denoted as random geometric graphs (RGGs).
An epidemic is considered as a process on the graph, where each device (i.e., vertex) can transition
between different states such as susceptible (S) (i.e., healthy but can be infected), infected (I) (i.e., com-
promised via a malware), and recovered (R) (i.e., malware is detected and removed). A malware worm can
only infiltrate from an infected device to a susceptible device if the two devices are directly connected via
an edge. Once a new device gets compromised by a malware, it becomes an infection threat to its directly
connected neighbors and so on.
The dynamics of epidemic infection/treatment are fully characterized via time domain models. Due to
several factors (e.g., medium access control protocols and per-link transmission rate), the time taken for
malware worm to infiltrate from an infected to susceptible device is random. Meanwhile, depending on the
malware detection and treatment technique, the time a device stays infected is also random. On average,
propagation and recovery rates (or probability per unit time) can be characterized, which are then used
to construct a system of differential equations that fully describes the temporal evolution of an epidemic.
Resorting to the fact that the total number of devices in the network remain fixed (i.e., the total population),
such system of equations can be solved to determine the percentiles of devices in each of the S, I, and R
states, as function of time. However, in RRGs, such system of differential equations is not tractable and
approximations are always sought [9].
8Instead of full temporal characterization, the final outcome of an epidemic infection can be directly
characterized. Such late-time characterization alleviates the mathematical complications (e.g., non-linearity
of differential equations) introduced by temporal models. In particular, late-time models characterize the
overall epidemic infiltration through the network without any information about the infection/treatment
rates. As mentioned earlier, the time taken for a malware worm to propagate from a device to each of its
neighbors is random and the time each device remain infected is also random. Hence, even after sufficiently
long time, some devices will be cured before infecting some of their neighbors and the malware worm
would only infiltrate through a subset of the network. For a given malware worm, the late time model
would show all devices that were infected at any point in time regardless if they got cured or not. Such
phenomenon of global and time oblivious worm diffusion, through a portion of the network, can be studied
via percolation theory, which is defined as follows
Definition 2. Percolation Theory is a well-developed mathematical field that characterizes global connec-
tivity in random graphs when vertices and their associated edges are removed. Connectivity is characterized
by the presence/absence of a giant component, which is the largest connected sub-graph that spans the
horizon.
Mapping to the aforementioned epidemic models, percolation theory can be used to characterize late-
time epidemic outbreak as follows. Consider the complete network graph and remove all devices, with
their associated edges, that are never infected (i.e., their neighbors are cured before malware infiltration).
After such devices removal, the existence (absence) of a giant component implies an epidemic outbreak
(quarantine). In the notation of percolation theory, we have the following definitions
Definition 3. Supercritical Regime defines the set of network parameters such that a giant connected
component exits.
Definition 4. Subcritical Regime defines the set of network parameters such that a giant connected
component does not exist.
Percolation theory is best suited to develop robust security countermeasures that are independent of
the epidemic infection/treatment rates. That is, no matter how fast (slow) is the infection (treatment) rate,
a defense mechanism that operates the susceptible devices in the subcritical regime ensures quarantined
epidemic. On the other hand, if the susceptible devices operate in the supercritical regime, then an epidemic
outbreak may occur if the treatment rate is not sufficiently faster than the infection rate. In the latter case,
the giant component size relative to the network size represents the percentile of infected devices.
It is worth noting that percolation theory is a well developed field that has been extensively used in
9(a) Malware epidemic outbreak for Random selection of
firewalls
(b) Malware epidemic outbreak for degree-aware selection
of firewalls
(c) Malware epidemic outbreak for random selection with
minimum DC
(d) Quarantined malware for degree-aware selection with
minimum DC
Fig. 2: Epidemic potential diffusion in the same network realization under different firewalls selection
strategies for firewalls percentage of 6% of the total network devices. The figure follows the same color
code for firewalls, secured zone, susceptible, and compromised IoT/CPS devices. The links between devices
denote potential routes for malware epidemic diffusion, which are obstructed by secured zones. Only figure
(d) eliminates the giant connected component, which implies quarantined epidemic.
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the literature to characterize ad hoc and cognitive network connectivity [8], [10], secure dissemination
of information [11], network resilience/reliability [12], and Internet malware epidemics [13]. However,
percolation models are barely used to characterize and develop defense mechanisms for epidemics in
LSWN. Note that, in wireless networks, epidemic propagation is highly restricted by the network spatial
topology, medium access control, and physical layer properties [14]. Hence, it is important to consider
RRG to account for the intrinsic properties of wireless networks [6], [8], [11]. In this regards, stochastic
geometry (see [15]–[19] for tutorials) can be utilized to model the spatial devices locations and construct
SINR-aware edges that connect devices that can reliably communicate to each other. Then, exploiting the
rich literature on percolation theory, epidemic propagation can be characterized, and defense mechanism
can be developed for a variety of IoT/CPS systems and use cases.
V. SPATIAL FIREWALLS DESIGN AND ASSESSMENT
A. Network Model and Proposed Approach
As discussed earlier, due to cost, energy, and computational power constraints, not all IoT/CPS devices can
adopt sufficient security mechanisms. Furthermore, state oblivious scheduled software attestation/patching
may deteriorate the IoT/CPS functionality due to unnecessary (delayed) patching of healthy (infected)
devices. Hence, we propose to strategically select some devices, denoted as spatial firewalls, and equip
them with state-of-the-art security mechanisms such as anti-malware and anomaly/intrusion detection pro-
grams. As shown in Fig. 1, each firewall enforces a security zone of radius Rf meters, where Rf is the
communication/detection range of firewalls. Then, all IoT/CPS devices within a secured zone, denoted as
protected devices, should validate codes (e.g., software, configuration, or control commands) with firewalls
before executing or relaying them. Hence, neither the firewalls nor the protected devices participate in
malware diffusion. Consequently, the secured zones enforced by the firewalls will split the network into
protected (i.e., green) and susceptible (gray) IoT/CPS devices. The design objective for spatial firewalls
is to enforce sufficient secured zones, denoted as critical percentage, that ensures quarantined epidemics.
Regardless of the infection/treatment rates, the firewalls provides a ubiquitous defense mechanism to thwart
wide-spread diffusion of malware and initiate informed (i.e., status-aware) software patching for infected
devices.
Interpreting the firewall design objective to the notion of percolation theory, it is required to remove the
minimum number of vertices from the IoT/CPS network graph such that the largest connected subgraph does
not percolate. In other words, it is required to place sufficient number of firewalls at effective locations such
that the network formed by devices outside the secured zones operate in the subcritical regime. Otherwise,
the epidemic spatial diffusion may get out of control and span the horizon. It is worth noting that the wireless
network topology is dynamic due to devices mobility. Furthermore, the security defense mechanism should
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be general in case there is no prior knowledge about the underlying devices locations. Hence, the spatial
firewalls should be selected among the set of vertices V in a RRG G, which accounts for devices wireless
communication range as well as the random spatial locations of devices.
A well established result in the literature for random graphs is that network percolation exhibit a phase
transition phenomenon between the supercritical and subcritical regimes. This means that it is feasible to
quarantine epidemics in LSWN if the correct percentage of devices are protected. Such critical percentage
could be mathematically quantified via percolation models. However, different from conventional percolation
problems, where individual vertices are randomly removed, in the spatial firewall problem a chunk of
proximate vertices (i.e., all devices in the spatial secured zones including the firewalls, as well as all of
their associated edges) are removed (c.f. Fig. 2). Hence, advanced percolation models, such as percolation
on networks with holes [20], are required for the design, implementation, and assessment of spatial firewalls.
Inspired by results from percolation theory, the firewalls design objective is decomposed to 1) find
minimum percentage of spatial firewalls that guarantees quarantined malware,5 2) select the spatial locations
of firewalls that minimizes the average sizes of connected clusters of susceptible devices. This article
examines four heuristic firewall selection schemes, namely, i) random, ii) degree-aware, iii) random with
minimum distance constraint (DC), and iv) degree-aware with minimum DC. Degree awareness is crucial
because devices with high degree would participate more to an epidemic diffusion. Intuitively, devices with
higher degrees are expected to have a significant impact on epidemic diffusion if selected as firewalls due
to the high number of protected neighbors within the secured zone. The minimum DC among the firewalls
guarantees good spatial distribution of secured zones across the network to thwart emerging epidemics in
different locations.
A pictorial illustration of the firewalls is shown in Fig. 2 for different selection strategies. While the
same number of firewalls is selected in all cases, Figs. 2a, 2b, and 2c, show poor spatial distributions of
secured zones that fails to eliminate the giant connected component. Thus, a wide spread of the malware
epidemic is viable. However, the degree-aware with minimum DC firewalls in Fig. 2d ensures a good spatial
distribution of the secured zones and succeeds to split the network into disjoint clusters. Hence, regardless
of the infection/treatment rates, a malware injected to any susceptible device within a cluster is prevented
to diffuse to other clusters in the network. Upon the detection of the malware, firewalls inform the security
administration to initiate localized software attestation/patching to all devices in the infected cluster.
B. Proof of Concept
While the proof-of-concept can be done analytically using tools from stochastic geometry and percolation
5Due to the involved CAPEX and OPEX of the spatial firewalls (e.g, hardware upgrade and software license), a cost efficient selection
strategy should quarantine an epidemic with less critical intensity of firewalls.
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Fig. 3: Probability of epidemic outbreak versus the percentage of firewalls.
theory, we resort to comprehensive Monte Carlo simulations to alleviate unnecessary mathematical details.
Each simulation run realizes 4 × 4 km2 random network with wrap around boundaries. The devices are
distributed in the simulation area according to a Poisson point process with intensity λ = 80 device/km2
(i.e., an average of 1280 device per simulation run). Each device is assumed to have a communication range
of 200 m, where a connection is realized between two devices that lie within the communication range of
each other. The firewalls are chosen among the network devices according to the implemented selection
scheme, where each firewall enforces a circular secured zone with a radius of 200 m. The devices that fall
within the secured zone are excluded and the global network connectivity is realized. Percolation is declared
if a giant component of susceptible devices that spans the simulation area vertically and horizontally exists.
Percolation means that the selected spatial firewalls fail to quarantine the malware infection. This is because
a malware infiltrated to any of the devices within the giant component can create an epidemic outbreak
within that component of susceptible devices without being obstructed by the selected spatial firewalls.
Furthermore, the number of disjoint clusters and the number of devices per each cluster are recorded. A
pictorial illustration of a single simulation run is depicted in Fig. 2, where percolation is declared for the
scenarios in Figs. 2a, 2b, 2c.
Fig. 3 shows the malware outbreak probability versus the percentage of devices that are selected as fire-
walls. Surprisingly, random firewall selection significantly outperforms the degree-aware selection scheme.
Such counter-intuitive behavior is due to the spatially correlated degree of devices. Hence, stand-alone
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Fig. 4: Number of disjoint clusters and size of the maximum cluster versus the percentage of firewalls.
degree awareness fails to quarantine the epidemic due to the spatial concentration of firewalls within small
geographical regions, which leads to overlapped secured zones (see Fig. 2b). The random selection of
firewalls provides a better spatial coverage of secured zones, and hence, succeeds to quarantine epidemics
when the firewalls are sufficiently dense (i.e, critical percentage 9%). Incorporating minimum DC improves
the spatial distribution of firewalls and reduces the required density of firewalls. The superior performance
of degree-awareness with minimum DC (critical percentage 6%) is due to the strategic selection of firewalls
in terms of both spatial distribution of secured zones and number of devices covered by each secured zone.
Fig. 4 shows the number of susceptible clusters along with the number of devices in the largest cluster.
As the intensity of firewalls increases, large network components break into smaller susceptible clusters
with less devices in each cluster. Hence, the number of clusters increases and the number of devices within
each cluster decreases. Fig. 4 confirms the insights of Fig. 3 regarding the firewalls selection schemes.
Degree and location awareness ensure that malware can only infect less number of devices within smaller
geographical regions when compared to other sections schemes. It is worth noting that the number of
clusters decreases in Fig. 4 when secured zones start to span and cover the entire simulation area, which
leaves small spatial gaps to form clusters.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article overviews the vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats in large-scale wireless IoT and CPS.
The article then proposes a novel technique, denoted as spatial firewalls, to quarantine and cure malware
epidemics in such IoT and CPS. In particular, we show that strategically selecting less than 10% of devices
and equipping them with up-to-date anti-malware programs is sufficient to thwart malware epidemics. To
this end, guidelines to design and characterize the impact of spatial firewalls is presented. Proof-of-concept
numerical results are presented and several firewalls selection schemes are evaluated, namely, random and
degree-aware with and without minimum distance constraints. Surprisingly, the random firewall selection
outperforms degree-aware firewall selection, which is due to the spatially correlated degree of devices
that lead to poor spatial distribution of firewalls. Adding a minimum distance constraint to degree-aware
selection scheme significantly enhances its impact in terms of percentile of firewalls required to spatially
quarantine malware epidemics and the size of infected clusters.
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